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Partisan Messages, Unconditional Strategies and Coordination in American Elections
I use evolutionary models to study how partisan messages and cuing contribute to—or perhaps
substitute for—strategic coordination by voters in American presidential elections. Cuing means
imitating another voter’s strategy: a cue tells a voter what to do, not what to think. Using
National Election Studies data from 1976–96 to simulate and estimate models of replicator
dynamics shows that voters respond to messages from other voters who are partisans. About 70
percent of voters use an unconditional strategy, which means their vote decisions do not depend
on their current evaluations of policies or other factors. About 30 percent of voters use a
coordinating strategy that involves systematic attention to the separation of powers and to other
voters. Voters seem to evaluate their strategies and make changes only sporadically. In most
elections, what the coordinating voters do determines what happens.Introduction
Many questions concerning people’s strategies, organizational involvements and social positions as
voters in American elections may be construed as questions about information. Do voters know
enough to to coordinate their voting decisions with one another, to send and receive meaningful
messages, to anticipate the consequences of their choices? These questions point in two directions.
One is a concern with whether voters are competent to make such decisions, and the other asks
whether voters really need to make such decisions.
Competence is the more familiar version of the information concern. The conventional wisdom
from generations of research and experience seems to prove that few if any voters are suﬃciently
attentive and informed that it is reasonable to describe them as optimal electoral strategists.
Converse (1964) classically questioned whether most people know enough about public policies to
make any judgments at all about them. By and large the image of an ignorant and passive public
remains ascendant (Althaus 2003; Alvarez and Brehm 2002; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996)
The necessity question points to institutions and processes voters are involved in and asks
whether the messages and cues the institutions provide substitute for complicated decisions by
the voters (Sekhon 2004). Here there are two strands of work, one emphasizing how messages
originate with political parties and interest groups (McKelvey and Ordeshook 1985; Forsythe,
Myerson, Rietz, and Weber 1993; Zaller 1992), the other focusing on how messages ﬂow through
social networks (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). The distinction between parties and interest
groups is not all that great, as we may think of parties as election-oriented organizations that
interest groups or activists struggle to control (Aldrich 1995; Miller and Schoﬁeld 2003).
Clearly voters who are individually incomptent may collectively comprise an electorate that is
more adept, not so much because of the wonders of aggregation (Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1997)
but because of the organizing power of informed signals voters may receive and because of the
networks through which the signals are conveyed. Indeed, when voters face uncertainty they may
rely on informative party signals, and the fact that voters ﬁnd the signals useful may in turn
encourage the parties to present the voters with signiﬁcantly distinctive alternatives (Snyder and
Ting 2002). Voters who rely on such signals may not make precisely the same choices as they
would make if they were individually fully informed (Bartels 1996; Feddersen and Pesendorfer
11997; Schattschneider 1960), but their choices are certainly diﬀerent from and often better than
the ones they would make absent such cues.
The questions about information present a challenge to work such as Mebane (2000) and
Mebane and Sekhon (2002), which argues that at election time the American electorate is
involved in a situation of large-scale strategic coordination. The claim is that American electors
(i.e., voters and nonvoters) in presidential and House elections act according to a Nash
equilibrium of a game they are all involved in, with all electors being informed by rational
expectations about the election outcome. The equilibrium features policy moderation and
institutional balancing between the president and the legislature, as in Alesina and Rosenthal
(1995), Alesina and Rosenthal (1996) and Iannantuoni (2003). Mebane (2000) and Mebane and
Sekhon (2002) ﬁnd that models in which such strategic coordination is assumed ﬁt National
Election Studies (NES) data from years 1976 through 1998 better than do models that assume
there is no equilibrium behavior but, instead, at best, nonstrategic spatial voting.
The information challenge to such work is primarily a challenge to resolve a major ambiguity:
how much of the strategic coordination that appears to occur is due to individuals’ personal
competence, and how much does it reﬂect the institutions and partisan environment in which
elections take place? The same ambiguity also aﬀects other theoretical and empirical work that
supports an image of strategic electorates, and not only in the United States. Among the aﬀected
work is Cox (1997), who analyzes many aspects of party systems using assumptions that there is
strategic voting based on rational expectations about electoral outcomes. Also implicated are
models of economic performance evaluations such as Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen (1997) and
Erikson, Mackuen, and Stimson (2002), each claiming in a diﬀerent way that voters’ rational
expectations about the economy strongly aﬀect both public opinion and government policy. In all
these cases it is unlikely that individuals are acting independently to produce the apparent
strategic equilibria or dynamics.
In this paper I use a collection of evolutionary models to study what may happen when
individuals are presented with partisan messages. The models implicitly embed individuals in
networks that let them adjust their behavior in response to messages that may originate in a wide
variety of places. A theme in the models is the idea that in a complicated informational
environment people pay the most attention to messages that seem to relate to and perhaps even
2come from people like themselves. Such messages may appear to be more trustworthy (Lupia and
McCubbins 1998) or perhaps simply more relevant to the person’s concerns than others. They
may involve immediate social relations such as family, friends and neighbors (Huckfeldt and
Sprague 1987, 1995; Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2005) or wider social networks (Berelson,
Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954).
If considerations of similarity help limit the scope of the connections through which
individuals receive messages, a consequence may be that the networks that convey eﬀective
partisan messages are thin, with most people linked to only a few others—few, that is, relative to
the size of the whole electorate. Theoretical work such as Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) suggests
that such restricted connections between people may produce outcomes that are collectively
superior to those produced by denser networks or more frequent and extensive communications.
A thinner network may slow the proliferation of responses to random misinformation. Because
political information is always subject to bias and noise, the ideal of a political order in which
everyone is fully aware of and responsive to the same common pool of information may not be as
desirable as Converse (1964) and work in that tradition may suggest.
Abstracting from all details of how people may in reality be in contact with or learn from
others, the models I introduce represent only the essential behavioral idea that when a voter
encounters someone who has similar attributes, the voter may decide to imitate the voting
strategy the other person is using. To imitate someone’s strategy, I shall say, is to take a cue from
them. This concept of cuing diﬀers from the idea that a cue is an informational shortcut (Popkin
1991). Here a cue tells a voter what to do, not what to think. The less satisﬁed a voter is with his
current strategy, the more likely he is to take cues from someone else. Speciﬁc models add various
forms of partisan messaging to this baseline of imitation. I use NES data to try to assess which of
the models best describes voters’ behavior in presidential elections.
The models I use specify several forms of replicator dynamics (Weibull 1995). The replicators
are diﬀerential equations that approximate stochastic processes of adaptation or learning that
individuals are assumed to undergo during the campaign period. I consider an environment in
which voters may use the coordinating strategy of Mebane (2000), or they may use one of four
strategies that imply unconditional voting behavior. A voter who uses an unconditional strategy
always makes the same choice regardless of the characteristics of the alternatives and regardless of
3the current electoral environment. Voters may imitate the strategies used by other voters whom
they happen to encounter. Because voters are more likely to keep their strategy when they are
satisﬁed with it, surviving strategies tend not to produce bad results. The evolutionary framework
allows a mix of strategies to be sustained in a diverse population (Samuelson 1997). By using
replicator dynamics to combine imitation with partisan signaling, I can connect the implausibly
demanding equilibrium results of Mebane (2000) to a somewhat more realistic image of individual
electors. As we will see, models such as the coordinating model of Mebane (2000) can ﬁt the data
well even when in fact only a small proportion of the electorate is behaving strategically.
I tie the analysis closely to observed voter behavior in two ways. First, I simulate the
replicators numerically, using NES data from presidential election years 1976–1996. Second, I
estimate choice models that include the possibility that unconditional strategies are used. These
estimates are based on approximations of the relationship the simulations identify between voters’
political evaluations and the probability of using each unconditional strategy. The links between
estimation and simulation are intricate, because the simulations depend on sets of model
parameter estimates derived from the same NES data. Indeed, one question that helps to
determine whether the partisan signals come from other voters is whether the iteration between
the estimation and simulation steps may be in a certain sense closed. A principal methodological
contribution of the paper is that I present new ways to use data-based criteria to choose among
simulated evolutionary models.
To foreshadow the results, I ﬁnd there is a persistent heterogeneity among the strategies
voters use. Most voters act unconditionally: they vote unconditionally for one party both for
president and for the House of Representatives, or they unconditionally vote a split ticket that
includes a vote for the House incumbent. A relative few act with full sophistication, using the
coordinating strategy. For voters who use an unconditional strategy, beliefs about policy,
performance or other factors do not aﬀect the vote. Voters receive messages from other
voters—from a subset of strong partisans—but notwithstanding changes that occur in their
opinions about policies and other political matters, they only sporadically change their voting
strategies. In most American presidential elections, the coordinating voters are the decisive
voters, so that in the aggregate, what those voters do determines what happens.
4Models
The models consider voters who make choices simultaneously for president and for a House
candidate. Only votes cast for the two major parties, denoted D and R, are considered. For each
election period there are n voters. Each voter i = 1,...,n chooses one of the four pairs of
presidential and House votes in the set K = {RR,RD,DR,DD}. The expected loss for voter i
from making choice ph ∈ K is a combination of two components: λi
ph = xi
ph − i
ph. Each element
of the vector xi = (xi
RR,xi
RD,xi
DR,xi
DD)0 is a parametric function of observed attributes such as
policy positions, party identiﬁcation, economic evaluation, and House district incumbency status.
The vector i = (i
RR,i
RD,i
DR,i
DD)0 is random, with a generalized extreme value (GEV)
distribution.
A voter may use any of a variety of strategies to decide how to vote. Using an optimizing
strategy, denoted sO, the vote choice Y ∈ K minimizes the expected loss:
Y i
O = arg min
ph∈K
λi
ph
There are also four strategies that involve unconditional voting rules, denoted sDD, sRR, sDR and
sRD. According to these strategies, the voter always makes the choice indicated by the subscript.
A voter may also use a mixed strategy in which each of the foregoing strategies is used with some
probability.1 To be speciﬁc, let S = (sO,sDD,sRR,sDR,sRD)0 denote a vector of m = 5 pure
strategies, and let ρi = (ρi
O,ρi
DD,ρi
RR,ρi
DR,ρi
RD)0 = (ρi
1,...,ρi
m)0 be the vector that indicates the
probability that voter i uses each of the strategies in S, 0 ≤ ρi
j ≤ 1,
Pm
j=1 ρi
j = 1. Naturally,
diﬀerent voters may use diﬀerent strategies.
In general the probabilities ρi are functions of time. Time here refers to dynamics occurring
during a single election, presumably toward the end of the campaign period, in the weeks or few
months before election day. To analyze the dynamics of ρi as time progresses, I exploit a duality
available in evolutionary game theory (e.g. Weibull 1995, 69–72), which entails associating each of
the n voters with a continuum of voters who all have the same attributes xi. Each of the voters in
each of these continua uses a pure strategy, but all the voters who have the attributes xi may not
use the same strategy. Now ρi indicates the proportion of the voters in continuum i that are using
1Although sO depends on the values of λ
i, sO is a pure strategy.
5each of the strategies in S. Alternating between the probabilistic and the proportional
interpretations of ρi is reasonable in the case of interest here, where n will immediately
correspond to the small number of respondents in an election survey sample (i.e., the NES) that
is drawn from a much larger electorate. We may assume that each voter in the electorate who has
the same attributes as a surveyed voter uses one of the pure strategies, but we do not know which
strategy each voter who happens to be included in the survey sample is using.
I assume that over time the random vector i changes in a natural way according to a leader
process (Resnick and Roy 1990). This means that from time to time each component i
ph of i
undergoes an increment in response to new information about the choice alternatives. The
variations in i mean that every alternative in K is best for voter i some of the time. If the
attributes xi are constant, then the proportion of the time that alternative ph is the best choice is
the same as the probability that the vote is ph ∈ K according to sO, assuming an observer who
knows xi but not i (Resnick and Roy 1990).
Replicator dynamics specify how ρi changes in response to the payoﬀs associated with each
strategy. I treat time as continuous, which means the replicators are systems of ordinary
diﬀerential equations for the time derivative of ρi, denoted ˙ ρi. To avoid clutter I suppress explicit
statement of the time index.
I consider two forms of replicator, corresponding to two conceptions of what a presidential
election campaign is. One idea is that a campaign period is unlike other times, so that it begins
at a particular moment, proceeds in an unstable manner and then ends. Election day is a kind of
deadline and not necessarily a point where the campaign processes have reached any kind of
dynamic equilibrium. The other idea is that while the campaign period may represent a
heightening of activity and attention, it is not utterly unlike other times. Here election day is just
a day not much diﬀerent from any other, representing a kind of slice through a process that is in a
steady state.
The ﬁrst form is the simplest possible replicator (Weibull 1995, 188–189), expressed by
˙ ρi
j = ρi
j(ui
j − ¯ ui), ¯ ui =
m X
k=1
ρi
kui
k , (1)
where ui
j > 0 denotes the payoﬀ voter i expects from using strategy si
j ∈ S, and ¯ ui is the expected
6payoﬀ given that ρi is used. Here payoﬀs are deﬁned in terms of the expected losses associated
with each alternative. Using the indicator function IX = 1 if X is true, otherwise IX = 0,
ui
j = −
X
ph∈K
λi
phI[si
j=ph] .
Weibull (1995, 152–161, 187–189) shows how (1) may be derived from a model of pure imitation
driven by dissatisfaction. In that model, a voter who is more dissatisﬁed is more likely to review
his strategy, and when a voter decides to change strategies he switches to the strategy used by the
ﬁrst voter he encounters who has the same attributes.
In the replicator of (1), a strategy that produces above average expected payoﬀs becomes
more likely to be used, and a strategy that produces below average expected payoﬀs becomes less
likely. A strategy that is persistently below average is eﬀectively eliminated, in the sense that ρi
j
approaches zero. Because the average expected payoﬀ changes over time as the mix of strategies
changes, and because the performance of a strategy in general depends on what other strategies
are being used, a strategy that has above average performance at one time may not perform as
well at a later time.
Because sO always selects the best alternative, almost surely ui
O > ¯ ui and hence ˙ ρi
O > 0. But
each unconditional strategy sometimes selects the worst alternative, in which case ui
ph < ¯ ui and
˙ ρi
ph < 0, so if the dynamic of (1) begins with ρi
j > 0 for all j and then runs for an indeﬁnitely long
period of time only sO survives. That is, as time increases, ρi
O ↑ 1. To obtain other values of ρi
using (1), it is necessary to choose a particular termination time; i.e., election day’s date matters.
The other form of replicator I consider includes a concept of reversion that allows the model
to achieve a stochastic steady state with, persistently, ρi
O < 1. The idea is that at any particular
time only a fraction µ of the voters who have attributes xi are involved in the processes of
imitation that (1) represents. The remaining 1 − µ of the voters are tending to fall away from
using sO, falling away more the more that ρi
O exceeds a threshold value η. This reversion to one of
the unconditional strategies may be thought to be due to the diﬃculty of using sO. For instance,
perhaps it is time consuming to use sO, so beyond a certain point the opportunity costs are too
great. A similar consideration may apply to a single voter when ρi
O is viewed as a probability: the
personal cost of sustaining a high value of ρi
O may be too great. In any case, the idea is that a
7voter who abandons sO picks up one of the unconditional strategies completely at random.
These ideas lead to the following replicator. For 0 < µ < 1 and 0 < η < 1,
˙ ρi
ph = µρi
ph(ui
ph − ¯ ui) + (1 − µ)(ρi
O − η)/4, ph ∈ K (2a)
˙ ρi
O = µρi
O(ui
O − ¯ ui) + (1 − µ)(η − ρi
O) . (2b)
The stochastic steady state to which (2a-b) converges is described by the following.2
Remark 1 Over an indeﬁnitely long period of time, the dynamic of (2a-b) maintains ρi
O ∈ (η,1)
and ρi
ph > 0, ph ∈ K. As µ is closer to zero, the upper bound on ρi
O is closer to η. If sph typically
has (ui
ph − ¯ ui) < 0, then eventually ρi
ph becomes and remains relatively small. If sph typically has
(ui
ph − ¯ ui) > 0, then eventually ρi
ph ≈ 1 − ρi
O with ρi
ph slightly smaller than 1 − η. If there are two
alternatives ph and ph∗ such that typically either ui
ph > ¯ ui or ui
ph∗ > ¯ ui, then ρi
O may eventually
stay near values substantially larger than η.
That is, in the steady state ρi
O remains less than 1, substantially less if µ is small. Indeed, if one
alternative typically gives the best payoﬀ, then ρi
O remains just larger than η, and ρi
ph
corresponding to that typically best ui
ph remains just smaller than 1 − η. If two alternatives
typically alternate in giving the best payoﬀ, then ρi
O can be much larger than η. Unconditional
strategies that choose alternatives that typically give inferior payoﬀs do not disappear but are
rarely used.
To represent partisan signaling in these models I allow the expected payoﬀs ui to change over
time in response to a stream of messages each voter receives. The payoﬀs represent judgments
about such matters as the voter’s perceptions of the policy positions the parties and candidates
are taking, the voter’s own preferences regarding those policies and the voter’s beliefs and
preferences regarding economic performance. Parties send messages about such matters during
presidential campaigns. In the absence of messages, (1) derives from the idea that voter i imitates
voters who have the same attributes (Weibull 1995, 187–189). Having a diﬀerent ui in (1) means
the voter takes cues from a diﬀerent set of voters than if there were no messages. The same
intrepretation applies to (2a-b). People who support diﬀerent parties receive diﬀerent cues.
2In (2a-b), as in (1),
Pm
j=1 ˙ ρ
i
j = 0 maintains
Pm
j=1 ρ
i
j = 1.
8I let the messages come from voters who are strong partisans in the NES sense of partisanship:
each message to a self-identiﬁed Democrat (including Independent Democrats) corresponds to the
observed attributes of a randomly selected strong Democrat, and each message to a self-identiﬁed
Republican corresponds to the observed attributes of a randomly selected strong Republican. To
be precise, let every unit of time to be divided into 30 equal intervals. Thus each unit of time can
be considered a simulated “month” (or sim-month) composed of 30 simulated “days” (sim-days).
At each sim-day I draw a new vector of observed attributes, denoted xV , by sampling from the xi
vectors observed among either strong Democrats or strong Republicans, depending on the
partisanship of voter i. For pure Independents, xV is drawn from the attributes of pure
Independents. In each case the voters from whom xV is drawn are restricted to be in a House
district with the same incumbency status3 as voter i. I compute ¯ xi = (xi + xV )/2 and
consequently expected losses ¯ λi = ¯ xi − i. The payoﬀs used in (1) and (2a-b) are then
ui
j = −
X
ph∈K
¯ λi
phI[si
j=ph] .
Subject to one condition, this form may represent a situation where the messages voters
receive come from other voters. The condition relates to the fact that the models depend on
values for the parameters that are used to compute the attributes xi. The next section of this
paper describes a method for using NES data to estimate the parameters in a way that takes the
replicator dynamics into account; i.e., the estimates depend on a previous run of the replicator. A
sharp question is whether the model can be closed in the sense that the parameter values that
drive the replicator reproduce themselves in the subsequent estimation. The messages used in the
model would then have the same characteristics as the strongly partisan voters, being generated
by the same data and the same parameter values. A model that is not closed I will say is open.
Failure to close the model—or failure to ﬁnd a closed model that ﬁts the data as well as an open
model—would make it doubtful that the model represents signaling that originates among voters,
because of the need to stipulate an external source. The most likely external source is just the
parties. An open model is most likely a model with uniﬁed party signaling in another guise. A
3Either a Democrat incumbent is running for reelection, a Republican incumbent is running, or there is an open
seat.
9necessary condition for a messaging model to represent messages that originate with other voters
is therefore that the model must be closed.
All told then, I will consider the six classes of models shown in Table 1. The three unstable
models, based on (1), depend on the choice of a duration for the replicator to run and to some
extent on the initial conditions. The steady state models, based on (2a-b), do not depend on a
particular duration but do depend on the choice of values for µ and η. I consider open baseline
models in which there is no messaging and in which there is messaging, each using both the
unstable and the steady state replicator. The open models feature two sets of parameter values:
the ones used to run the replicator and the ones produced by the subsequent estimation step. I
also consider closed versions of the messaging models.
*** Table 1 about here ***
Estimation
To estimate the parameters of the evolutionary models using cross-sectional NES data, I deﬁne a
likelihood for each voter’s stated vote choices using the cross-sectional distribution of the
probabilities ρi that each replicator generates.4 Given xi but treating i as unknown, we can
deﬁne the probability πi
ph that the vote is ph ∈ K according to sO:
πi
ph =
e
−xi
ph
G(xi)
∂e−G(xi)
∂e
−xi
ph
(3)
where G(xi) deﬁnes the joint cumulative distribution function of i,
e−G(xi) = Pr(i
RR < xi
RR,i
RD < xi
RD,i
DR < xi
DR,i
DD < xi
DD)
(McFadden 1978). The particular deﬁnition of G(xi) depends on the correlation structure
assumed for i (see, e.g., (8) in Appendix B). Voter i chooses ph ∈ K either by using sO or by
using sph, so given xi and ρi the overall probability of choosing ph is gi
ph = ρi
Oπi
ph +ρi
ph. Using the
gi
ph values as probabilities in a multinomial choice model, the component of the log-likelihood for
a voter i who chooses alternative ph is loggi
ph.
4Readers who are not interested in the methods used to estimate the models may wish to skip this section.
10The ideal approach to estimating such a model is not feasible. Ideally we would run the
replicator for each voter using each trial set of the parameter values that deﬁne xi. This method
is not feasible because the computations to run the replicator so frequently are too extensive.
Instead, I adopt a two-step method. First I use one set of xi values, based on a ﬁxed set of
parameters, to run the replicator and hence determine ρi for all voters. Then I use the
distribution of the ρi values to estimate new values for the parameters that deﬁne xi. The ρi
values used in the second step are not the ﬁxed numbers determined in the ﬁrst step but instead
are the values of functions that approximate the cross-sectional distribution of the replicator
results. This allows the ρi values used for each i to change with the new parameter values as xi
also changes, in a way that is compatible with the cross-sectional distribution determined by the
replicator. If the new xi values fall within the range of xi values used to estimate the
approximating function, we can be conﬁdent that the results of the two-step method are close to
what the ideal approach would have produced.
I use a set of quadratic polynomials to approximate the cross-sectional relationship between
the xi values and ρi. I regress the logits log(ρi
ph/ρi
O), ph ∈ K, on the following vector:
Zi =

1,xi
RR,xi
RD,xi
DR,(xi
RR)2,(xi
RD)2,(xi
DR)2,(xi
DD)2,xi
RRxi
RD,xi
RRxi
DR
0
. (4)
Because of symmetries in the particular deﬁnition of xi I ultimately use, every linear or quadratic
function of elements of xi is a linear function of Zi. For each logit I estimate the vector Aph
cross-sectionally in the following model by ordinary least squares:
log(ρi
ph/ρi
O) = A0
phZi + vi
ph , (5)
where vi
ph has mean zero and variance σ2
ph.5 Using the estimates ˆ Aph and a vector ˜ Z having the
5In each year 1976–1996 I estimate the regressions (5) separately for each of three groups of voters: all Democrats,
including leaners; all Republicans, including leaners; and pure Independents. With this partitioning of voters, the
regressions (5) are highly accurate for most voters. Finer groupings of voters produce inferior results, due to the
limited range of Z
i values.
11form of (4), I compute m approximate strategy probabilities ˜ ρj( ˜ Z):
˜ ρO( ˜ Z) =

1 +
X
ph∈K
exp( ˆ A0
ph ˜ Z)


−1
(6a)
˜ ρph( ˜ Z) = ˜ ρO( ˜ Z)exp( ˆ A0
ph ˜ Z), ph ∈ K . (6b)
Using these approximate probabilities I deﬁne choice probabilities
˜ gi
ph = ˜ ρi
Oπi
ph + ˜ ρi
ph, ph ∈ K , (7)
where ˜ ρi
O = ˜ ρO( ˜ Zi), ˜ ρi
ph = ˜ ρph( ˜ Zi), and ˜ Zi is (4) with xi deﬁned using the current parameter
estimates. Let yi
ph = 1 if i chooses ph, otherwise yi
ph = 0. Using sampling weights φi,6 the
log-likelihood is
L =
n X
i=1
φi X
ph∈K
yi
ph log ˜ gi
ph ,
where n is the number of voters in the NES sample. I refer to this as an approximated
evolutionary dynamics (AED) model. To estimate the model I keep the values ˆ Aph used in (6a)
and (6b) constant while ﬁnding new values for the parameters of xi to maximize L. Using this
likelihood, estimates of the parameters of xi map through (3), (6a), (6b) and (7) to give an
approximation of the choice probabilities induced by the replicator.7
I evaluate each replicator numerically for each voter in the survey sample, with a new,
statistically independent value of i being used each sim-day. The natural interpretation of this
setup is that each voter considers a new set of random information about the choice alternatives
each day, although it remains to be determined what relationship simulated time bears to voters’
actual experiences. To focus on each replicator’s expected path of evolution, I repeat each
simulation at least ten times for each i and use the mean of ρi over the replications at each time
in (5). Replicator (1) begins with a low probability of using sO and equal probabilities of using
each unconditional strategy: the initial conditions are ρi
O = 1/10 and ρi
ph = 1/4 − 1/40.
6The sampling weight is the reciprocal of the probability that i is included in the NES sample, rescaled for
convenience so that the sum of the weights equals the original sample size.
7I use code written in R (R Development Core Team 2003) to obtain maximum likelihood estimates.
12Replicator (2a-b) begins with ρi
O = η and ρi
ph = (1 − η)πi
ph.8
For the steady state models, simulating the replicator and estimating an AED model for a
large set of η and µ values would involve an inordinate amount of computing. I use a screening
procedure that tends to make the steady state AED model produce a distribution of ˜ ρi that is
similar to the distribution given by a target model. I use a set of twenty observations from each
year to choose values of η and µ that produce a distribution of ρi from simulating (2a-b) that is
close to the distribution produced in the target model. I use the simulated steady state ρi values
from sim-month 36 to compare the distributions; by sim-month 36, inspection shows that all of
the speciﬁcations have reached steady-state values. I then estimate the steady state AED model
using the chosen η and µ values. To smooth variations around the long-run steady-state mean, for
each i in the AED model I use multiple ρi values to estimate Aph in (5)—in particular, the six ρi
values for sim-months 31 through 36. Experience shows this method produces steady state AED
model ˜ ρi distributions broadly similar but hardly identical to the target model.
I compare the AED models to one another in terms of how well each ﬁts the survey data, and
I also compare them to a choice model based on assuming that all voters use sO. Because the
AED models do not nest the model based solely on sO, I use a nonnested hypothesis test to
compare them. The models use the same data, the same deﬁnitions of the variables and the same
functional form speciﬁcations to deﬁne xi and πi
ph, ph ∈ K, but the likelihoods are the same only
on the boundary of the evolutionary models that occurs when ρi
O = 1. In (1), ρi
O can get
arbitrarily close to 1.0 but never equals 1.0. In (2a-b), ρi
O is strictly less than 1.0. Likewise, the
alternative AED models based on either diﬀerent replicators or the same replicator at diﬀerent
simulated times are not nested. I use Vuong’s statistic (Vuong 1989, eqns. 5.6–5.8), here denoted
V , to compare how well the models ﬁt the data. V has a standard normal distribution if the
models ﬁt the data equally well.
Simulated and Estimated Dynamics
To support comparisons between the evolutionary models and the results of Mebane (2000), I
simulate the replicators using the same data as Mebane (2000), namely, NES data from the six
presidential elections of 1976–1996. I specify the optimizing strategy, sO, to be the coordinating
8Examples of the Mathematica (Wolfram Research 2003) code used to run the simulations appear in Appendix C.
13strategy Mebane deﬁnes, and I deﬁne xi exactly as in Mebane (2000). I generate a sequence of i
values that have the same GEV distribution used in Mebane (2000). The deﬁnitions of xi and G
are described in detail in Appendix B. Details regarding the speciﬁcation of the replicators and
regarding model selection also appear in Appendix B.
Comparing the various models shows that having an explicit model of messaging substantially
improves the ﬁt to voters’ behavior, and that closed models that represent the idea that the
messages originate with other voters ﬁt the data well. Table 2 reports the log-likelihood value for
the coordinating model and each of the AED models, along with the results of the nonnested tests
between every pair of models. The unstable and the steady state models without messaging (UN
and SN) ﬁt the data about equally well and slightly but not signiﬁcantly better than the
coordinating model. But the coordinating model and the UN and SN models all ﬁt signiﬁcantly
worse than the unstable open model (UO). These results suggest that if the coordinating model
somehow implicitly captures the messaging and cuing that occurs during presidential election
campaigns, it does not provide as good a representation as the explicit treatment in the UO
model. The steady state open model performs poorly, ﬁtting the data worse than all the other
models. The unstable closed model (UC) ﬁts the data well, indeed slightly but not signiﬁcantly
better than the UO model. The ﬁt of the steady state closed model (SC) is worse than both the
UC and UO models, although not signiﬁcantly so, but the SC model ﬁts signiﬁcantly better than
the models without messaging and better than the coordinating model.
*** Table 2 about here ***
The results favor the closed models: UC among the unstable models and SC among the steady
state models. The relative success of the closed models is compatible with the idea that voters
receive and respond to partisan messages that originate with other voters. Of course the fact that
the models are compatible with voter origination does not contradict the possibility that there is
uniﬁed party signaling that simply gets ﬁltered through strongly partisan voters. Whatever the
ultimate origin of the messages, the results suggest the messages do not diverge from the
considerations brought to bear by strong partisans who use sO in their voting decisions.
Between the two closed models, UC ﬁts the data better than SC does. Because the gap
between UC and SC is not all that large, it is likely that presidential campaigns fall somewhere
between the alternative conceptions that motivate (1) and (2a-b). For most people, perhaps, the
14campaign period is unique and terminates on election day, while for others an active contest
between the parties never really ends.
The fact that SC does so well makes it interesting to consider what its characteristics suggest
about the learning processes the models are supposed to represent. The most striking feature of
SC is the low value of µ it seems to imply. Having µ = .02 suggests that at any particular time
only one in ﬁfty voters is involved in the processes of imitation that (1) represents. Imitation, in
this case, is not producing very frequent or rapid changes in voters’ strategies. Relatively few
voters appear to be using sO: considering all voters in all years, the mean of ˜ ρi
O in the SC AED
model is .29 with standard deviation .03. The small value of µ suggests that the 71 percent of
voters who are using an unconditional strategy rarely reappraise the strategy. While every voter
continually receives a stream of messages in the model, the fact that µ = .02 means that roughly
98 percent of the time voters are not doing anything to update their strategies in response to that
information. Their opinions about the payoﬀs associated with each strategy may ﬂuctuate, as new
messages arrive and random events occur, but mostly they do not reevaluate their strategies, and
mostly they do not change them.
Of course, SC does not ﬁt the data quite as well as UC, so most likely there is more dynamism
among voters during the campaign period than the SC model would suggest. But an image of
thin interactions and rare changes in voters’ strategies is probably closer to the truth than one of
ubiquitous cuing and great volatility.
Estimated Strategy Distribution
The distribution of ˜ ρi implied by the best ﬁtting AED model—the UC model—conﬁrms the
impression that voters mostly do not use sO. Over all voters in all years, the mean of ˜ ρi
O in the
UC AED model is .28 with standard deviation .02. Table 3 shows the mean value of ˜ ρi by voter
party identiﬁcation and House incumbent status, computed using the UC AED model parameter
estimates. Table 3 shows mean values of ˜ ρi
O ranging from .26 to .31. The highest values of ˜ ρi
O
occur for strong partisans when either a House incumbent of their same party is running or there
is an open seat. The lowest values of ˜ ρi
O occur for pure Independents.
*** Table 3 about here ***
The use of unconditional straight-ticket strategies depends strongly on the status of the House
15incumbent. Strong, weak and leaning partisans are all highly likely to vote a straight ticket for
their party unconditionally when a concordant House incumbent is running. For Democrats in
such circumstances the mean of ˜ ρi
DD ranges from .61 to .63, and for Republicans the mean of ˜ ρi
RR
ranges from .64 to .67. With an open seat, these means drop more for Republicans than for
Democrats. With an open seat, for Republicans the mean of ˜ ρi
RR ranges from .48 to .57 while for
Democrats the mean of ˜ ρi
DD ranges from .53 to .58. But when a House incumbent from the
opposite party is running, it is Democrats whose propensity to give unconditional support to their
party shrinks most. In this circumstance the mean of ˜ ρi
DD ranges from .32 to .43 for Democrats,
and the mean of ˜ ρi
RR ranges from .42 to .54 for Republicans. For each status of the House
incumbent it is strong partisans who always have the highest mean probability of unconditionally
supporting their party. Partisans almost never unconditionally vote a straight ticket for the other
party when a concordant House incumbent is running, and they rarely do so otherwise. Pure
Independents are relatively unlikely to use either sRR or sDD, but between the two sRR is more
likely. For pure Independents, the mean of ˜ ρi
RR ranges from .16 to .33 while the mean of ˜ ρi
DD
ranges from .05 to .22. For pure Independents sRR or sDD are each least likely when a House
incumbent of the other party is running.
Unconditional strategies to vote a split ticket are most likely when there is a House incumbent
to attract votes from supporters of the other party. But Democrats facing such an incumbent are
more likely to split their tickets to vote unconditionally for that incumbent than Republicans are:
with a Republican incumbent, the mean of ˜ ρi
DR among Democrats ranges from .27 to .36; with a
Democrat incumbent, the mean of ˜ ρi
RD among Republicans ranges from .14 to .22. Democrats are
slightly more likely than Republicans are to vote an unconditional split ticket for the other
party’s House candidate when there is an open seat. In that case the mean of ˜ ρi
DR among
Democrats ranges from .09 to .13 while the mean of ˜ ρi
RD among Republicans ranges from .07 to
.11. Partisans are unlikely to use an unconditional split-ticket strategy that involves voting for
the other party’s presidential candidate. The mean probabilities for that range from .01 to .09.
Coordinating Strategy Parameters
The UC AED model parameter estimates show that with one important exception the UC model
and Mebane’s (2000) coordinating model support the same conclusions about how voters behave
16when using sO. Table 4 reports the UC AED model parameter estimates, with 95% conﬁdence
intervals.9 For convenience the table also shows the point estimates for the coordinating model.
Most of the coordinating model point estimates fall within the 95% conﬁdence interval for the
corresponding parameter in the UC AED model. The coeﬃcients for the dummy variables that
indicate House incumbent status diﬀer slightly: the coordinating model’s estimate for the eﬀect of
having a Democratic incumbent running (cDEM) is slightly below and the estimate for the eﬀect
of having a Republican incumbent running (cREP) is slightly above the UC model’s 95% intervals.
The coeﬃcients for party identiﬁcation diﬀer considerably. The coeﬃcients that distinguish pure
Independents (cI) and Republicans (strong, weak and leaners, respectively cSR, cR and cIR) from
Strong Democrats are substantially smaller in the UC model than in the coordinating model.
Indeed, the conﬁdence intervals of the coeﬃcients for weak Democrats (cD), Independent
Democrats (cID), pure Independents, Independent Republicans and weak Republicans
substantially overlap one another.10 The intercept parameters for each year (cP0,76 through cP0,96
and cH0,76 through cH0,96), which indicate the baseline for Strong Democrats, are of smaller
magnitude in the UC model than in the coordinating model. This result conveys a picture
startlingly diﬀerent from the coordinating model and indeed from the one usually seen in analysis
of NES data: usually all Republicans have baselines sharply diﬀerent from all Democrats. The
UC AED model results suggest that for voters who use sO there are essentially three diﬀerent
starting points in terms of raw partisanship: strong Democrats and strong Republicans have
distinctive baselines, and everyone else is the same.
*** Table 4 about here ***
The estimated UC AED model parameters agree with Mebane’s (2000) estimates regarding
the way voters who use sO respond to the separation of powers between the president and the
legislature in policymaking. The policy outcomes voter i expects in the coordinating model are
αθi
P + (1 − α)[ ¯ Hθi
R + (1 − ¯ H)θi
D], where θi
R and θi
D are respectively the policy positions of the
Republican and Democratic parties, θi
P is either θi
R or θi
D depending on which party controls the
9In light of the complications parameter estimates on a boundary of the parameter space induce in the asymptotic
distribution of the estimates (Moran 1971; Self and Liang 1987), I follow Mebane (2000) and bootstrap the score
vectors to estimate quantiles of the distribution implied by αD,76 = αD,84 = ρD,84 = ρD,92 = ρR,80 == ρR,96 = 1.
The notable asymmetry of some of the conﬁdence intervals primarily reﬂects the nonlinearity of the model. The
conﬁdence intervals are estimated with the vectors ˆ Aph and functional form (6a-b) treated as known.
10The standard errors reported in Mebane (2000, Table 2) show such overlap does not occur in the coordinating
model.
17presidency, α measures the power of the president (0 ≤ α ≤ 1), and ¯ H is the proportion of votes
Republicans are expected to win nationally in the legislative election ( ¯ H satisﬁes a ﬁxed point
constraint). There are 12 diﬀerent estimates for α, one for each party in each of the six election
years. The UC AED model estimates are all close to the coordinating model estimates: in every
year the winning presidential candidate was expected to be more powerful than the legislature.11
The models produce the same value in each year for ¯ H (to two signiﬁcant ﬁgures). Seven
parameters (q, bP, bHP, bH, bPH, bE0 and bE1) determine the weight policy positions have in each
voter’s decision making, and all have similar estimates in the two models. The large, positive
values for bP and bH mean that voters who use the coordinating strategy act as if their votes
measurably aﬀect the presidential and legislative election outcomes, and the fact that bHP is
positive while bPH is zero reﬂects the existence of a presidential coattail eﬀect.12 The models also
produce the same values for an additional quantity that aﬀects the weight policy considerations
have, namely ¯ P, which is the probability that the Republican will win the presidency ( ¯ P is also
subject to a ﬁxed point constraint).
The UC AED model conveys the same impression as the coordinating model regarding voters’
reactions to economic conditions when using sO. The estimates for the coeﬃcents of the variable
that measures subjective retrospective evaluations (cP1,76, cH1,76, etc.) suggest that those who
think economic conditions have gotten worse usually reduce their support for candidates of the
incumbent president’s party.
Discussion
First consider the fact that the UC and SC models seem to ﬁt the data so similarly, despite the
fact that (1) and (2a-b) are so diﬀerent. That ˜ ρi
O in the UC AED model varies so little across
conditions of partisanship and House incumbent status supports the notion that sO is simply too
diﬃcult or too costly for most voters to use most of the time. There is no reason why the cost of
using sO should vary substantially with whether an incumbent is running or with a voter’s policy
preferences. So, by and large, the distribution of such costs should not be related to partisanship
and House incumbent status. In that case, the cost-induced upper bound on ρi
O should be
11Mebane’s (2000) model also includes 12 parameters that measure how positions each voter states for the parties
and presidential candidates combine to produce θ
i
R and θ
i
D. The models agree regarding those parameters’ estimates.
12For details see Mebane (2000, 50).
18roughly the same among voters in all the partisanship and incumbent status categories, and that
is the pattern in Table 3. The UC AED model thereby inductively conﬁrms one of the ideas that
motivate (2a-b), without the idea being formally built in. Even though (1) is unstable, the UC
AED model estimates point strongly to a key concept that implies steady state behavior.
So despite the fact that the SC AED model ﬁts slightly worse than the UC model, it is
reasonable to take seriously what the SC model suggests about the heterogeneity of diﬀerent
voters’ experiences during presidential campaigns. The small value of µ in the SC model suggests
that at any given time during a campaign only a small percentage of voters are evaluating their
strategies and making changes in imitation of others they encounter. That form of cuing happens
only sporadically. On the other hand, if we take from the UC model a campaign duration of 60
sim-days, then µ = .02 suggests that reevaluation occupies roughly one (.02(60) = 1.2) sim-day. If
we boldly map sim-days directly onto days, that may suggest that for each voter typically there is
one day during the campaign period on which the voter makes up his or her mind what strategy
to use.13 For voters who decide to use an unconditional strategy, that decision is eﬀectively the
vote choice decision. Rare changes due to cuing would be consequential changes, as voters would
tend to stick with the strategies they adopt.
The persistent heterogeneity of strategies for each i has two sharply divergent interpretations,
depending on how one resolves the basic ambiguity regarding ρi: does ρi represent a mixed
strategy for each voter i, or does ρi measure the proportion of voters with attributes xi who are
using each of the ﬁve strategies in S?
Concluding that ρi represents a mixed strategy means that almost every voter has the
personal competence to use sO and at any given time may do so. In this case, drawing on
Samuelson (1997), it is in a formal sense reasonable to treat the SC AED model parameter
estimates as calibrating a Nash equilibrium wherein each voter’s gains from using sO are balanced
by the costs represented by η in (2a-b). The results then suggest that in equilibrium every voter
sometimes works hard to be vigilant and make the best decision, but mostly voters are doing
what is easy and voting without having to make any decisions at all. Given the distribution of ˜ ρi
O,
13It is interesting that the 60 sim-day duration of the best ﬁtting unstable model roughly matches the period from
Labor Day to election day that is traditionally the time when the presidential general election campaign occurs. Too
many features of the model are arbitrary to believe the result validates the reality of the model’s timing. Nonetheless,
the correspondence is intriguing.
19the probability of a voter’s being vigilant is typically less than 0.3. The SC model is more suitable
for interpretation as a Nash equilibrium solution than the UC model is, because nothing about
the formulation of (1) has voters taking into account the fact that the election will happen at a
particular date. Strictly speaking, the only Nash equilibrium solution of (1) occurs in the limit
when ρi
O = 1 for all i. That is, with (1) the only Nash equilibrium is the coordinating model. In
that light, the fact that the UC model (for sim-month two) ﬁts the data slightly better than the
SC model does may be evidence that the situation on election day is not a Nash equilibrium for
all voters. But the fact that the SC model ﬁts the data as well as it does may mean that the
discrepancy from a Nash equlibrium conﬁguration is small.
Concluding instead that ρi measures the proportion of voters who are using each of the ﬁve
strategies is compatible with the idea that only a few voters are personally competent to use sO.
Such an interpretation would be ﬁrmly in line with the tradition that runs through Converse
(1964, 1990), wherein most people are not thought to know enough to think coherently about
politics, let alone to make optimal electoral decisions. The voters who use sO take into account
not only one another but also the majority of voters who are voting unconditionally.14 So the
success of the SC AED model may indicate there is approximately a Nash equilibrium among the
voters who use sO but not among the whole electorate.
The interpretation of ρi as measuring proportions implies a story about the voting behavior of
most voters that is incompatible with the behavioral model of Campbell, Converse, Miller, and
Stokes (1960). The more than 70 percent of voters who use an unconditional strategy according
to the UC AED and SC AED models do not begin with a baseline of party sentiment from which
they may depart in response to short-term considerations of policy, performance, personality or
whatnot. The nature of the unconditional strategies is such that voters who use them do not make
new voting decisions at election time at all. The commitment to use an unconditional strategy
might be described as a “standing decision” (Key 1966), but it is a decision more radically
habitual than most believe is entailed by being a party identiﬁer (compare Green, Palmquist, and
Schickler 2002). If a voter uses an unconditional strategy, the voter’s beliefs about policy,
performance or other factors have no eﬀect on the vote cast. A voter whose decisions depend on
assessing variable considerations is not using an unconditional strategy. In view of the value of µ
14This refers to the fact that in the AED models ¯ P and ¯ H are ﬁxed points. See Appendix B.
20in the SC AED model, it is a question whether the frequency with which voters reconsider their
strategies and, possibly, change them through imitation is high enough to correspond to the
contingent variability Campbell et al. (1960) and the succeeding literature attribute to all voters.
In both the UC and SC models, the mix of strategies occurs in an environment that presents
voters with a stream of partisan messages. In a precise technical sense, the messages come from
anyone who is a strong party identiﬁer, but if we step back a bit from the exact way the
simulations are formulated we arrive at an interesting connection to the idea that the parties are
nothing more than the electon-oriented face of activists and interest groups. Consider the
interpretation of ρi as measuring proportions. In that case Table 3 shows that only about 30
percent of strong partisans use sO. It is reasonable to think that only those who are themselves
using information about policy positions and economic performance in their own voting decisions
are likely to be the originators of the information. Those who are not using the information are
most likely, at best, simply passing it along. So only about 30 percent of the strong partisans
would be candidates for being message originators. Over all six election years, about 38 percent of
voters are strong partisans, implying that the message originators are limited to about 11 percent
of voters. In contemporary parlance, this 11 percent might be described as comprising each
party’s vocal “base”—the voters politicians and party leaders are loath to oﬀend. If the base were
unconditionally loyal to the party they favor, politicians would not need to be so careful to
minister to them. In the UC and SC models, the greatest risk for politicians is not that these
voters will personally switch to support the other side, even though, as users of sO they might
readily do that in response to undesirable policy stances. The greatest risk is that they will start
to send messages that cue the unconditional voters to follow them out of the party.
Mostly voters do not use sO, but the proportion who do is ample to make the coordinating
voters the decisive voters in most American presidential elections. This means that the AED
model estimates support the aggregate implications of the theory of policy moderation and
institutional balancing developed by Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) as strongly as the coordinating
model estimates of Mebane (2000) do. The estimates for all of the parameters that matter for
that theory are eﬀectively the same in both models. The electorate may be characterized as
engaged in large-scale strategic coordination, as deﬁned by Mebane (2000), even though more
than 70 percent of the electorate is voting unconditionally for one party or the other, or
21unconditionally voting a split ticket.
Voters do not act in isolation. They communicate with others. Many voters look to others for
guidance about what they should do. But the low value for µ in the SC AED model suggests that
such cuing interactions are relatively infrequent, too rare, perhaps, for presidential elections to be
subject to bubbles and fads such as more prevalent imitation would tend to produce. During the
campaign many voters eﬀectively never change their voting strategies—strategies that specify
unconditional voting behavior—notwithstanding changes that occur in their opinions about the
issues, the economy and other volatile factors. For most voters, most of the time, those opinions
shift with the partisan messages they receive. The messages may not be particularly meaningful
apart from their function as markers for cues the voters follow on the sporadic occasions when
they reevaluate their strategies. A subset of voters originate the messages, which both reﬂect and
structure the competition between the parties.
Such an electorate, in such a comprehensively partisan environment, is the one represented by
the evolutionary models I have investigated, in light of the empirically derived estimates of the
parameters of those models. Embedded in that electorate is a subsystem of voters who behave
like optimal strategists, taking into account the institutions of American government and the
strands of policy debate, warily eyeing and counterbalancing one another. Beyond presidential
elections and the coordinating model, I imagine such an arrangement generally describes what
happens in electoral systems and in the dynamics of national political economies. Most actors act
unconditionally, a relative few act with full sophistication, and information ﬂows through
networks from the one group to the other. In the aggregate, it may be that what the more
sophisticated actors do dominates, because they are more volatile and because the messages they
originate tend, eventually, to drag the others along. But close inspection of many individuals may
leave one unimpressed with their competence. To focus on the individuals in isolation, however,
without developing a clear picture of all that ties them together, is a mistake.
Appendix A
Proof of Remark 1: In (2a-b), i varies over time, but each value of i persists during a ﬁnite
period of time. Because µ(1 + ui
O − ¯ ui) ≥ 1 implies ˙ ρi
O > 0, and because, for each value of i,
(ui
O − ¯ ui) decreases as ρi
O increases, eventually 1 > µ(1 + ui
O − ¯ ui). Deﬁne
22νi
O = η(1 − µ)/(1 − µ(1 + ui
O − ¯ ui)). If 1 > µ(1 + ui
O − ¯ ui), then sgn( ˙ ρi
O) = sgn(νi
O − ρi
O). If
ρi
O < 1, then almost surely ui
O > ¯ ui and therefore νi
O > η. Hence ρi
O eventually becomes and
remains larger than η. Because ρi
O = 1 implies νi
O = η, ρi
O stays below 1.0. As µ is closer to zero,
the upper bound on ρi
O is closer to η.
Consider the situation with ρi
O > η. If ui
ph < ¯ ui, then sgn( ˙ ρi
ph) = sgn(νi
ph − ρi
ph), where
νi
ph = (1 − µ)(η − ρi
O)/(4µ(ui
ph − ¯ ui)) > 0. This bounds ρi
ph above zero. If typically ui
ph < ¯ ui, then
eventually ρi
ph tends to stay near νi
ph, and the more negative (ui
ph − ¯ ui) typically is, the smaller
νi
ph is. If ui
ph ≥ ¯ ui, then ˙ ρi
ph > 0, but (ui
ph − ¯ ui) decreases as ρi
ph increases. If typically ui
ph > ¯ ui,
then eventually ρi
ph ≈ 1 − ρi
O, and because in this eventuality typically ui
O − ¯ ui ≈ 0 whenever
ui
ph > ¯ ui, νi
O is typically just slightly larger than η and ρi
ph eventually remains slightly smaller
than 1 − η. If there are two alternatives ph ∈ K and ph∗ ∈ K such that typically either ui
ph > ¯ ui
or ui
ph∗ > ¯ ui, then typically ui
O − ¯ ui does not approach zero so that, if µ is not very small, νi
O may
be substantially larger than η and ρi
O may stay near values substantially larger than η. 
Appendix B
The following deﬁnition of xi
ph is the same as the deﬁnition of xphi given by Mebane (2000, eqs.
(6a–d)), using this paper’s convention that individuals are indexed using a superscript i, and
using γD and γR to denote the parameters Mebane (2000) denoted ρD and ρR. The variables
mentioned in the formulas have the following meanings (see Mebane (2000) for full details). θi,
ϑi
PD, ϑi
D, ϑi
PR and ϑi
R are the voter’s average placement on several policy items of, respectively,
self, the Democratic presidential candidate, the Democratic party, the Republican presidential
candidate and the Republican party. ECi is the voter’s evaluation of the national economy over
the past year. PPi = 1 if the president is a Republican and PPi = −1 if the president is a
Democrat. DEMi = 1 if a Democrat is running for reelection in the voter’s congressional district,
otherwise DEMi = 0. REPi = 1 if a Republican incumbent is running in the voter’s, otherwise
REPi = 0. PIDD
i, PIDID
i, PIDI
i, PIDIR
i, PIDR
i and PIDSR
i are dummy variables that
correspond to levels of the NES seven-point scale measure of partisanship, using “Strong
23Democrat” as the reference category. I discuss ¯ H and ¯ P below.
θi
D = γDϑi
PD + (1 − γD)ϑi
D , 0 ≤ γD ≤ 1 ,
θi
R = γRϑi
PR + (1 − γR)ϑi
R , 0 ≤ γR ≤ 1 ,
˜ θi
D = αDθi
D + (1 − αD)[ ¯ Hθi
R + (1 − ¯ H)θi
D] , 0 ≤ αD ≤ 1 ,
˜ θi
R = αRθi
R + (1 − αR)[ ¯ Hθi
R + (1 − ¯ H)θi
D] , 0 ≤ αR ≤ 1 ,
βi = (1 + exp{−bE0 − bE1ECi})−1 ,
wi
P = (1 − βi)|θi − ˜ θi
R|q − βi|θi − ˜ θi
D|q ,
wi
H = q(θi
D − θi
R)[(1 − αR) ¯ P(1 − βi)|θi − ˜ θi
R|q−1 sgn(θi − ˜ θi
R)
+ (1 − αD)(1 − ¯ P)βi|θi − ˜ θi
D|q−1 sgn(θi − ˜ θi
D)] ,
zi
RR = −cP0 − cH0 − cREPREPi − (cP1 + cH1)PPiECi
− cDPIDD
i − cIDPIDID
i − ciPIDI
i − cIRPIDIR
i − cRPIDR
i − cSRPIDSR
i ,
zi
RD = −cP0 + cH0 − cDEMDEMi − (cP1 − cH1)PPiECi ,
zi
DR = cP0 − cH0 − cREPREPi + (cP1 − cH1)PPiECi ,
zi
DD = cP0 + cH0 − cDEMDEMi + (cP1 + cH1)PPiECi
+ cDPIDD
i + cIDPIDID
i + ciPIDI
i + cIRPIDIR
i + cRPIDR
i + cSRPIDSR
i ,
xi
RR = (bP + bHbPH)wi
P + (bH + bPbHP)wi
H + zi
RR ,
xi
RD = (bP − bHbPH)wi
P + (bPbHP − bH)wi
H + zi
RD ,
xi
DR = (bHbPH − bP)wi
P + (bH − bPbHP)wi
H + zi
DR ,
xi
DD = −(bP + bHbPH)wi
P − (bH + bPbHP)wi
H + zi
DD .
In Mebane (2000), all voters use the coordinating strategy and, in equilibrium, each voter has
rational expectations about the way everyone else will vote. ¯ P and ¯ H measure these expectations.
¯ P is the probability that the Republican will win the presidency. ¯ H is the proportion of votes
Republicans are expected to win nationally in House races. Formally, ¯ P and ¯ H are complicated
functions of πi
ph, ph ∈ K. See Mebane (2000) for details. In equilibrium, ¯ P and ¯ H are ﬁxed points
of the relationship between voters’ behavior and voters’ beliefs about the election outcome.
In the AED models, ¯ H and ¯ P are computed as in Mebane (2000), except using ˜ gi
ph instead of
24πi
ph. This implies that the existence of the replicator is treated as common knowledge for voters
using sO. AED model estimates satisfy a ﬁxed-point condition involving ¯ H and ¯ P. When
simulating the replicators I do not impose the ﬁxed point constraint. Instead, the numerical
values for ¯ P and ¯ H computed using the coordinating model or using the estimates of a previous
AED model are used, depending on the model parameters used to compute xi.
Mebane (2000) uses
G(x) = e−xRR +

e−xRD/(1−τ) + e−xDR/(1−τ)
1−τ
+ e−xDD , (8)
where 0 ≤ τ < 1 (Mebane 2000, 41–42). To sample from this distribution,15 I combine standard
type 1 extreme value variates (Johnson, Kotz, and Balakrishnan 1995, 24) with variates from the
bivariate extreme value distribution exp[−(e−xRD/(1−τ) + e−xDR/(1−τ))1−τ] produced using the
method of Nadarajah (1999), which generates unit Fr´ echet bivariate values that I transform to
have standard type 1 marginals. For background see Kotz, Balakrishnan, and Johnson (2000) and
Mari and Kotz (2001).
When running (1) or (2a-b) for the open models (UN, UO, SN and SO), I use the parameter
estimates for the best coordinating model reported in Mebane (2000) to compute xi. For the UN
and UO models I run (1) for 12 sim-months and estimate the AED model using the simulation
results from the end of each sim-month. Of the 12 UN models, the largest L value is obtained for
sim-month eleven, and of the UO models the largest is obtained for sim-month two. These two
models are also better than the models of the same type for the other sim-months according to V ,
although the diﬀerences are not always statistically signiﬁcant. Therefore in the text I focus on
these two models.
For the UC model, I initially used the UO AED model parameter estimates to compute xi in
(1), but the resulting UC AED model does not satisfy the conditions for closure: the 95%
conﬁdence intervals for several parameters substantially fail to include the corresponding
parameter values that were used to run (1). Using these initial UC AED model parameter
estimates to compute xi and run (1) and then using the resulting ˜ ρi distribution to estimate the
UC AED model eliminates the disparity.16
15I use τ = 0.392 as estimated in Mebane (2000).
16The 95% conﬁdence intervals of the iterated UC AED model contain the initial UC model parameter values used
25For the SC model, I use the UC AED model’s parameter estimates to compute xi when
running (2a-b). The resulting SC AED model satisﬁes the conditions for closure.17
I use the screening procedure for choosing η and µ to match simulations of each of the steady
state models to the distribution of ˜ ρi produced by the corresponding unstable AED model.
Matching SN to the UN AED model gives η = .2, µ = .9, matching SO to the UO AED model
gives η = .32, µ = .45, and matching SC to the UC AED model gives η = .3, µ = .02.
Appendix C
Following is Mathematica code used to simluate (1) for the initial UC model using 1976 NES
data. Each of the ﬁles called randsi.dat, i = 1,...,10, contains 10,000 pseudorandom vectors
independently generated with the GEV distribution (8). File obsS76.dat contains the xi vectors
for the UO AED model estimates.
AppendTo[$Echo, "stdout"];
randmats = Table[rands[i], {i, 10}];
Do[
fname = "rands" <> ToString[i] <> ".dat" ;
randmats[[i]] = Import[fname, "Table"]; , {i, 10}
];
mix := 1/2;
getpty[obsmat_, k_] := obsmat[[k,5]];
getinc[obsmat_, k_] := Module[{fdem,frep},
fdem = obsmat[[k,6]];
frep = obsmat[[k,7]];
inc = If[fdem==1, 1, If[frep==1, 2, 3]]; (* 1 Dem, 2 Rep, 3 Open *)
Return[inc];
];
idx[t_] := 1 + IntegerPart[30 N[t]];
x[1][t_] := obs[[1]] * mix + rands[[idx[t], 1 ]];
x[2][t_] := obs[[2]] * mix + rands[[idx[t], 2 ]];
x[3][t_] := obs[[3]] * mix + rands[[idx[t], 3 ]];
to run (1), except the initial model has ˆ cIR = 1.42 while the upper bound of the iterated model’s 95% interval for
cIR is 1.41.
17The 95% conﬁdence intervals of the SC AED model contain the UC AED model parameter values used to run
(2a-b), except the UC AED model has ˆ cREP = 1.22 while the upper bound of the SC AED model’s 95% interval for
cREP is 1.19.
26x[4][t_] := obs[[4]] * mix + rands[[idx[t], 4 ]];
x[5][t_] := Max[x[1][t], x[2][t], x[3][t], x[4][t]] ;
xavg[t_] := (x[1][t] r[1][t] + x[2][t] r[2][t] +
x[3][t] r[3][t] + x[4][t] r[4][t] + x[5][t] r[5][t]) ;
runsim[n_] := NDSolve[{
r[1]’[t] == r[1][t] (x[1][t] - xavg[t]),
r[2]’[t] == r[2][t] (x[2][t] - xavg[t]),
r[3]’[t] == r[3][t] (x[3][t] - xavg[t]),
r[4]’[t] == r[4][t] (x[4][t] - xavg[t]),
r[5]’[t] == r[5][t] (x[5][t] - xavg[t]),
r[1][0] == 1/4-1/40, r[2][0] == 1/4-1/40,
r[3][0] == 1/4-1/40, r[4][0] == 1/4-1/40,
r[5][0] == 1/10},
{r[1], r[2], r[3], r[4], r[5]},
{t, 0, n}, AccuracyGoal -> Infinity, MaxSteps -> Infinity];
simit[time_, obsmat_, m_] := Module[{pty, inc, ridx, oidx, tlim, swrk},
smix := 0;
obs = obsmat[[m, {1, 2, 3, 4}]];
tlim = time 30;
pmat = Table[pvec[i], {i, tlim}];
Do[
pty = getpty[obsmat, m];
inc = getinc[obsmat, m];
ridx = Random[Integer, {1, ptyinccount[[pty, inc]][[1]] }];
oidx = ptyincindx[[pty, inc]][[ridx]];
pty2 = Switch[pty,
1, 1,
2, 1,
3, 1,
4, 4,
5, 7,
6, 7,
7, 7];
ridx2 = Random[Integer, {1, ptyinccount[[pty2, inc]][[1]] }];
oidx2 = ptyincindx[[pty2, inc]][[ridx2]];
pmat[[i]] = smix * obsmat[[oidx, {1, 2, 3, 4}]] +
(1-smix) * obsmat[[oidx2, {1, 2, 3, 4}]];
, {i, tlim}];
swrk = Table[sol[i], {i, 10}];
Do[
rands = randmats[[k]];
Do[
rands[[i]] = rands[[i]] + pmat[[i]] * (1-mix) ;
, {i, tlim}];
swrk[[k]] = runsim[time];
, {k, 10}];
27Return[swrk];
];
states = Table[Table[st[i][j], {i, 683}, {j, 5}], {im, 12}];
obsmat = Import["obsS76.dat", "Table"];
ptyincindx = Table[{}, {i, 7}, {j, 3}];
ptyinccount = Table[{}, {i, 7}, {j, 3}];
Do[ ptyinccount[[i, j]] = {0};, {i, 7}, {j, 3}];
nrows = Length[obsmat];
Do[
pty = getpty[obsmat, k];
inc = getinc[obsmat, k];
ptyinccount[[pty, inc]] = ptyinccount[[pty, inc]] + 1;
ptyincindx[[pty, inc]] = Append[ptyincindx[[pty, inc]], k] ;
, {k, nrows}
];
esumtabs[k_, sols_, sols2_, sols3_] := Module[{},
Return[Evaluate[
( Sum[Table[r[i][k], {i, 5}] /. sols[[j]], {j, 10}]
+ Sum[Table[r[i][k], {i, 5}] /. sols2[[j]], {j, 10}]
+ Sum[Table[r[i][k], {i, 5}] /. sols3[[j]], {j, 10}])
/ 30]];
];
time := 12;
Do[
sols = simit[time, obsmat, m];
sols2 = simit[time, obsmat, m];
sols3 = simit[time, obsmat, m];
Do[
states[[im, m]] = esumtabs[im, sols, sols2, sols3][[1]];
, {im, 12}];
FortranForm[states] >> "stateSS.76.out";
, {m, 683}];
To simluate (2a-b) for the steady state model, the function runsim is deﬁned as follows. The
parameter mu in the program equals 1 − µ in (2a-b).
runsim[n_] := NDSolve[{
r[1]’[t] == (1-mu) r[1][t] (x[1][t] - xavg[t]) + mu (r[5][t] - eta)/4,
r[2]’[t] == (1-mu) r[2][t] (x[2][t] - xavg[t]) + mu (r[5][t] - eta)/4,
r[3]’[t] == (1-mu) r[3][t] (x[3][t] - xavg[t]) + mu (r[5][t] - eta)/4,
r[4]’[t] == (1-mu) r[4][t] (x[4][t] - xavg[t]) + mu (r[5][t] - eta)/4,
r[5]’[t] == (1-mu) r[5][t] (x[5][t] - xavg[t]) + mu (eta - r[5][t]),
28r[1][0] == (1-eta) props[[1]],
r[2][0] == (1-eta) props[[2]],
r[3][0] == (1-eta) props[[3]],
r[4][0] == (1-eta) props[[4]],
r[5][0] == 1 - (1-eta) (props[[1]]+props[[2]]+props[[3]]+props[[4]]) },
{r[1], r[2], r[3], r[4], r[5]},
{t, 0, n}, AccuracyGoal -> Infinity, MaxSteps -> Infinity];
The props vector contains the choice probabilities from the coordinating model.
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33Table 1: Classes of Evolutionary Voting Models
Replicator Dynamics
Messages Unstable (1) Steady State (2a-b)
None UN SN
Open UO SO
Closed UC SC
34Table 2: Evolutionary Voting Model Fits and Nonnested Tests
Model Type
sO UN UO UC SN SO SC
sO
a −3186.0
UNb 0.5 −3181.7
UOc 3.1 2.5 −3155.3
UCd 3.2 2.4 0.3 −3154.5
SNe 0.7 0.0 −2.8 −2.8 −3181.4
SOd −1.0 −1.3 −5.3 −4.9 −1.4 −3199.8
SCg 3.2 2.4 −0.7 −0.8 2.9 4.2 −3159.4
Notes: Diagonal values show the log-likelihood (L) for each model. Oﬀ-diagonal values show the
statistic (V ) for the non-nested test of ﬁt between the row and column models. V > 0 means the
row model has the better ﬁt, while V < 0 means the column model has the better ﬁt.
a Coordinating model of Mebane (2000). b Sim-month eleven, xi in (1) from the sO model.
c Sim-month two, xi in (1) from the sO model. d Sim-month two, xi in (1) from iterated UC
estimates. e η = .2, µ = .9, xi in (2a-b) from the sO model. f η = .32, µ = .45, xi in (2a-b) from
the sO model. g η = .3, µ = .02, xi in (2a-b) from the UC AED model.
35Table 3: Probability of Use of Strategies with the Unstable Closed AED Model, 1976–96
Strategies
Democratic Incumbent sRR sRD sDR sDD sO
Strong Democrat .00 .03 .03 .63 .31
Democrat .00 .04 .05 .61 .29
Independent Dem. .00 .04 .05 .62 .29
Independent .16 .26 .11 .22 .26
Independent Rep. .42 .22 .05 .03 .28
Republican .44 .21 .05 .03 .28
Strong Republican .54 .14 .02 .01 .28
Open Seat sRR sRD sDR sDD sO
Strong Democrat .01 .03 .09 .58 .30
Democrat .01 .04 .13 .53 .29
Independent Dem. .01 .03 .12 .55 .29
Independent .33 .17 .13 .10 .27
Independent Rep. .48 .11 .09 .03 .29
Republican .48 .10 .09 .03 .30
Strong Republican .57 .07 .05 .01 .30
Republican Incumbent sRR sRD sDR sDD sO
Strong Democrat .01 .01 .27 .43 .27
Democrat .03 .02 .37 .32 .26
Independent Dem. .03 .02 .36 .34 .26
Independent .32 .04 .31 .05 .29
Independent Rep. .64 .02 .05 .00 .29
Republican .64 .02 .06 .00 .29
Strong Republican .67 .01 .02 .00 .30
Note: Each row shows the average value of ˜ ρi among voters who have the indicated combination
of party identiﬁcation and House incumbent status, using the maximum likelihood estimates of
the UC AED model for sim-month two.
36Table 4: Parameter Estimates for the Unstable Closed AED Model
UC AED sO
a UC AED sO
parameter MLE lower upper MLE parameter MLE lower upper MLE
τ .28 .15 .43 .39 cD .97 .73 1.22 .90
q 1.04 .92 1.20 1.03 cID .86 .56 1.13 .77
bP 4.93 3.66 5.80 3.92 cI 1.12 .83 1.41 1.92
bHP 1.90 1.18 3.07 1.88 cIR 1.13 .82 1.41 2.82
bH 5.93 4.00 9.21 5.16 cR 1.25 .97 1.52 2.88
bPH .05 −.18 .13 .02 cSR 1.95 1.63 2.25 3.54
αD,76 1∗ .54 1.00 1∗ cDEM 1.08 1.03 1.12 1.02
αD,80 .40 .13 .54 .40 cREP 1.22 1.18 1.24 1.32
αD,84 1∗ .63 1.00 .77 cP0,76 −.73 −.92 −.55 −1.05
αD,88 .67 .41 .93 .67 cP0,80 −.59 −.85 −.34 −.85
αD,92 .98 .77 1.00 .98 cP0,84 −.19 −.38 .01 −.65
αD,96 .83 .67 1.00 .83 cP0,88 −.52 −.72 −.30 −.90
αR,76 .64 .31 1.00 .76 cP0,92 −.48 −.75 −.22 −.89
αR,80 .96 .76 1.00 .95 cP0,96 −.87 −1.08 −.63 −1.14
αR,84 .45 .34 .63 .54 cH0,76 −.52 −.71 −.38 −.94
αR,88 .74 .55 .87 .74 cH0,80 −.50 −.71 −.27 −.91
αR,92 .56 .30 .79 .56 cH0,84 −.42 −.59 −.26 −.87
αR,96 .09 .00 .52 .10 cH0,88 −.60 −.76 −.40 −1.06
γD,76 .93 .55 1.00 .99 cH0,92 −.30 −.47 −.07 −.76
γD,80 .86 .47 1.00 .86 cH0,96 −.41 −.57 −.21 −.85
γD,84 1∗ .45 1.00 .97 cP1,76 .21 −.13 .51 .22
γD,88 .91 .55 1.00 .78 cP1,80 .65 .29 .97 .42
γD,92 1∗ .40 1.00 1∗ cP1,84 .57 .24 .90 .48
γD,96 .75 .44 1.00 .74 cP1,88 .37 −.01 .79 .29
γR,76 .61 .10 1.00 .65 cP1,92 .36 .00 .69 .35
γR,80 1∗ .64 1.00 1∗ cP1,96 .83 .42 1.21 .68
γR,84 .82 .40 1.00 .78 cH1,76 .25 −.03 .49 .22
γR,88 .63 .17 1.00 .63 cH1,80 .03 −.23 .27 .04
γR,92 .52 .14 .90 .56 cH1,84 .02 −.19 .24 .01
γR,96 1∗ .45 1.00 1∗ cH1,88 .30 .06 .60 .28
bE0 .37 .15 .60 .31 cH1,92 .24 .05 .48 .22
bE1 .61 .25 .97 .48 cH1,96 .36 .07 .63 .32
Notes: Maximum likelihood estimates. Asterisk indicates a boundary-constrained parameter.
AED results show the point estimate and the lower and upper bounds of the 95% conﬁdence
interval. Pooled NES survey data, 1976–96, n = 4,859. a Coordinating model point estimates are
the same as in Table 2 of Mebane (2000).
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